An Armistice for Ukraine? Like the one in Korea?
The New York Times reports that US officials are planning to propose an "armistice" for Ukraine allegedly similar to how the Korean war ended in 1953. However, an Armistice Agreement like the Korean does not align with Russia's goals and probably can't be achieved if limited to a ceasefire.
The 1953 agreement was reached after difficult negotiations that involved United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, the former Soviet Union and United Nations forces. Its main provisions were
suspending open hostilities;
withdrawing all military forces and equipment from a 4,000-meter-wide zone, establishing the Demilitarized Zone as a buffer between the forces;
both sides will not enter the air, ground, or sea areas under control of the other;
an arrangement for the release and repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons; and
a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and other agencies to discuss any violations and to ensure adherence to the truce terms.
The Korean armistice is now 72 years old. For the most part it has prevented open war involving North and South Korea.
The demilitarized zone or DMZ in Korea is about 160 miles long and 2.5 miles wide. Running through the DMZ is a Military Demarcation Line (MDL) which is where the opposing forces were when an armistice was reached. The DMZ does not extend to the Yellow Sea which was not included in the armistice. The DMZ itself does not follow the 38th parallel north which was the boundary agreed by the US and the USSR at the end of World War II, although parts of the DMZ follow the 38 parallel. Other than the Yellow Sea issue (including a number of islands that are heavily militarized), the DMZ is reasonably close to a final border should North and South Korea ever normalize their relations and sign a peace treaty. The North Koreans have hinted, from time to time, they are seeking a peace agreement (and especially US recognition and US security assurances), while the issue in South Korea is far more divisive and uncertain, fearing that normalization could undermine stability in South Korea and lead to a deal where US and allied forces would be withdrawn.
The Ukraine issue is territorial, military and political. Russia annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson provinces in September, 2022 and Crimea in 2014. While the borders of Crimea are generally well recognized, the borders of the four provinces are not so clear. Based on the official Ukrainian Oblast designations, Russia does not fully control any of these territories and fighting is going on as the Russian army appears to be aiming at occupying as much territory as possible before negotiations start.
Assuming that a deal could be made on borders, there are a host of questions that are more complicated. Among them are the rights of citizens on both sides of any demarcation line, trade between Ukraine and Russia, whether key utilities can be restored and utilized such as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power complex, water supply to Crimea from Ukraine, the status of ports and port and storage facilities on the Black Sea, the status of military ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, the location of long range weapons, and the presence of NATO forces on Ukraine's soil. Additional issues include the status of Ukraine's armed forces, Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, types of security guarantees, oil and gas transit and related sanctions on Russia.
An armistice would need to cover the presence of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk area (Russia has liberated about 50% of the Kursk incursion, but it could take months before the Ukrainians are finally pushed out if the war continues).
When the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953 United Nations Forces were stationed in South Korea and Chinese "volunteers" were in the North. Ukraine is different: officially there are no NATO forces (strictly defined) in Ukraine, although the Russian army is in Ukraine. Numerous reports say that a number of NATO countries (UK, France and even Germany) are preparing to send troops to Ukraine when an Armistice is agreed and to offer Ukraine security guarantees. One problem is that an Armistice monitoring force and a Armistice military deployment that would provide security guarantees to Ukraine are not the same thing.
Under the original Minsk agreements (2014, 2015) the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements. OSCE sent observers, not an army. OSCE then had 57 members including Russia and Ukraine. Essentially the deal was to end hostilities and to grant autonomy to Luhansk and Donetsk (although both would remain territories inside Ukraine). The deal was never implemented.
Russia's war objectives, as we understand them, include not only recognition of the annexed areas, but the demilitarization of Ukraine and an agreement that Ukraine will not become a NATO member. Whether this includes security guarantees with major NATO countries is not clear. It is hard to see how an Armistice Agreement could be concluded without addressing these issues.
The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice, that would include some sort of buffer zone, essentially freezing the conflict and conceding some Ukrainian territory on a de facto, but not de jure basis. In this context such a deal on these broad terms would be similar to the 1953 Korean Armistice.
Obviously the Russian outlook does not align with the one under development in Washington. Russia is not looking for an armistice but for a comprehensive deal with the US and NATO. A temporary Armistice Agreement (essentially a ceasefire in place) might be possible if it was linked to agreed political steps, but it seems unlikely to be accepted as any long term solution. Biden administration informants have hinted at a 10 year or even 20 year pause, but that idea does not have much traction for Russia as it would allow Ukraine to rebuild its army and its weapon's stockpile.
President Trump has some cards to play. He could send more aid to Ukraine to prolong the conflict but it is doubtful this is Trump's aim. He can offer sanctions relief to the Russians, even some accommodation with NATO. At the same time, the new administration knows how fragile Ukraine itself is, with its military losing one battle after another, short on manpower, encountering popular resistance to the enforced draft, and suffering high casualties.
It is hard to predict where any of this will go, but President Trump has signaled his desire to speak to Russian President Putin, starting with a phone call in the days ahead. Trump will table the idea of an Armistice Agreement: the Russians will demand considerably more.
There will be no Korean-type armistice, there will be no German-type division or any other thing that does not address Ukraine not going into NATO and the EU. There will also be no deployment of European 'Peacekeepers' in Ukraine, which is NATO by default, unless we want WW III. The only issue is what Russia wants, because Russia has the troops on the ground and they are quiet happy to continue the war if need be to get what they want. All they will do is keep advancing putting more pressure on the other players as what leverage they have gets less and less.
Unfortunately I think Stephen simplifies the negotiations without looking at the various players in this. I wrote this for someone last week as we discussed what might happen under Trump and not considered in this article - but that might add to it.
This is a five-way negotiation. Trump and his MAGA supporters, the Liberal NeoCons, the EU and UK and Zelensky, even before you get to Russia.
The Russians
The Russians are the easiest, having already set out their stall and its position is well known:
Ukraine outside NATO and neutral, and probably now outside the EU (the Russians say that the EU has a military element linked to NATO within the EU).
Ukraine forces reduced to 85,000 men,
Recognition of the five oblasts (Crimea, Luhansk, Dontez, Zaporizhya, Kherson) as Russian,
Restoration of equal rights for Russian speakers in Ukraine, and
Restoration of the Russian Church in the Ukraine.
Putin might negotiate on the margins for this but he will stick to the baseline for domestic political reasons. He also holds the biggest card on the table in that the Russian Army is in the Ukraine and NATO is not. Should the minimum demands of the Russians not be met they will keep fighting. A continued advance may also lead to more demands.
The Russians have refused to freeze the contact line, as has been suggested, until negotiations are complete. The danger is that if they gain something substantial, like Russian speaking Odessa Oblast for example, then they might add that to their demands.
Trump and MAGA
To do his Presidential agenda (build up against China, pursue his domestic opponents and reform the US/North America) Trump and his MAGA supporters need to shut down both the Ukraine and Middle East wars. They know that the 1990s Pentagon goal of being able to fight two major wars at the same time is unobtainable and will derail Trump's agenda. Trump has some instinct that the Ukraine War has weakened the US, a situation which goes against the MAGA agenda. He has made the right noises, stating very recently that Putin warned him in Trump 1.0 that bringing Ukraine into NATO would provoke war - and that he understands the Russian rationale. He has blamed Biden, calling Ukraine Biden's war (ignoring his own role in continuing Obama's policy of training and arming Ukraine in his first administration), and he is open to talking to Putin - something Biden refused to do.
He is more experienced than in his first administration, is better prepared, has supporters in position (subject to ratification) and is not willing to have the state institutions flimflam him as it did last time. He has won the election outright and may not get the pushback from the Legislature (at least for the first two years) and no lawfare that could stymie his administration as it did in Trump 1.0 with Russsiagate. He also has the backing of much of the electorate who want the money being spent in Ukraine spent on them and their defence - they are tired of the Liberal Wars that gained the US nothing, while things are broken at home.
Economically Trump wants to reduce the cost of living and removing sanctions on Russian trade will do this in the long run. Strategically he needs to move the Russians away from the Chinese and this will be his opening gambit - perhaps this will succeed but perhaps not. The Russians do not trust Trump or the Americans in general - and any agreements with Trump could be overturned by the next President. The Russians will negotiate hard, and they will put measures in place to lock the US and Europe into their promises.
But will Trump be able or be allowed to accede to Russian baseline demands? Will the Liberal NeoCons, Europeans and Zelensky let him? The problem is that the longer the US is involved in the war, the less time he has to complete his agenda, and there are a lot of people who want the war to continue.
Then there is the possibility that Trump will get bored and move on to something else. How much political capital does he want to expend - and Trump does not do nuisance well.
Trump also has a weak hand here as he has no troops on the ground, and all the sanctions in the world imposed on Russia have not worked. The military equipment cupboard is also almost bare - as admitted on CNN last night by the Pentagon Spokesperson - so giving extra equipment over and above what Biden gave to Ukraine would prove hollow. Should Trump become entangled in Ukraine, he will own the War and alienate his voter base.
The Liberal NeoCons
The NeoCons believe that the US can fight in Ukraine and the Middle East as well as build up against China, all at the same time despite evidence to the contrary. They are in the current Biden Administration (where the Bidens have been trying to do their best to sabotage Trump before he is inaugurated), some within the incoming Trump Administration, within the professional civil service and outside the organs of Government in think tanks, etc.
Some NeoCons spin their line because they believe what they say, they might receive monetary remuneration from taking that position, or it benefits them in some other way. They are positing various positions that would either gain victory in negotiations that had been lost on the battlefield, or that limit Russian gains which are seen as temporary and that can be retrieved latter. They will be the first to blame Trump should Ukraine fall (after 20th January) or negotiations meet Russian baseline demands.
And Trump only has four years. Can the NeoCons wait him out and keep the war going or will they attempt to sabotage his negotiation efforts?
The Europeans
The Ukrainian War, in combination with other factors, has improvised Europe, weakened their militaries and undermined many long-cherished assumptions about NATO and the EU, caused disunity within NATO and the EU, given a voice to what the European political elite consider extremist elements - closer to Trumpian MAGA elements - both right and left, caused political upheaval within European countries, continued the deindustrialization of Europe and generally caused instability. One would think that the European political mainstream would welcome an end to the war - but the opposite is true.
The countervailing argument is that the Europeans see the war as keeping the Americans in Europe. They are scared that American, in concentrating on the Chinese will leave Europe to its own devices (Keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down - as one commentator put it). Therefore, the political elite are ready to sacrifice their wellbeing and subordinate themselves to US whims, but also in encouraging the US to move against European interests to benefit themselves. The Governments of Europe - with a few notable exceptions, had been egging Biden on and feared the coming of the Trump Administration who is ambivalent at best about NATO, wants to concentrate against China and close down Ukraine.
Watch for the Europeans to make things difficult in the negotiations and place barriers to Trump's efforts.
Zelensky
Lastly, Zelensky has a number of psychological and legal barriers to negotiation.
- The first is the legal law forbidding Ukraine, on pain of death, from negotiating with Russia.
The law will have to be overturned legally. How will the Ukrainian Nationalists feel about
that?
- Secondly, Zelensky has promised the return of the conquored oblasts to Ukraine - either
by force or diplomatically (no plan has been presented how this is going to be achieved)
and will not accept the permanent loss of territory.
- Third, the Nationalists are likely to launch a coup or at least attempt to kill Zelensky to halt
or delay negotiations. Most of the population are calling for negotiations, the Nationalists
are not.
- Lastly, the Russians will not negotiate with Zelensky as they regard him as illegitimate.
Zelensky was supposed to have held an election by 17 May 2024 or hand over the
Presidency to the Rada Speaker - none of which happened. An election will have to be held,
and assuming - a big assumption - that Zelensky wins, while all under Russian pressure all
along the front.
As the negotiations go on, expect Zelensky to be difficult and not accept any unwelcome compromises made by Trump. Expect the Ukrainians to mount provocations and expect the Russians to keep advancing.
Overall, I am betting that in 2025 the war will be in on the battlefield and not at the negotiating table. The issue is, Will Trump still be trying to negotiate when the defeat occurs. If so, then the Europeans and NeoCons will make sure Trump owns that defeat.
"The US view is that Russia is hurting enough economically and its losses in the Ukraine war serious enough to incentivize the Russians to accept an Armistice..."
That seems highly unlikely to this observer. The U.S. [government] view has been highly unrealistic for this entire conflict, driven more by desired outcomes than a realistic appraisal of actual conditions, and this seems no different.