I am happy that the Americans and NATO are losing. Ukrainians were led down the Primrose Path, for them it’s a terrible tragedy and a sorry thing to watch. There’s been talk about rounding up, fighting age Ukrainian males in Europe and bringing them back to fight. That would be a comedy of errors. God help you if American Empire becomes interested in your country; The political Gnosticism of the liberal imperium will get you killed.
The global American empire is pernicious. They created this war by encroaching on Russia. The cynically used the Ukraine and sent their boys to die. The Russians are standing up to American hegemony. That’s why I’m enjoying Americans getting a blackeye. Why did Americans want to take down the Russians? I say political Gnosticism. Their democracy promotion is a nonsense. Everywhere they go they lay waste.
So why am I conflicted?
Why am I a traitor to my own interests? The Americans are a bunch of assholes on the world stage. Yet here I sit in southwest Florida. Hum.
Isn’t the loss of Ukraine at least a neutral? No more BS about NATO readiness or invincibility. No more whining about EC’s 2% contribution. Its sh*t or get off the pot time. once again we prove to all, politicians cannot be trusted.
WWIII has not started and obviously NATO members do not think that would be worthwhile.
Or maybe even winnable.
NATO now has been given a clear view what they will face if/when Putin decides to resume his quest for reconstructing his empire.
All the early happy talk could not change the fact that Ukraine could not win a protracted war with Russia. If that took $100-200 billion (and 500,000 Ukrainians) to learn, then bad on us.
Especially bad on us if as you say Biden wants to waste more US taxpayer money and Ukrainian blood by waiting until after November election. Proxy wars are always evil, but that is no less than a mortal sin.
From my perspective, the loss in and of Ukraine is the best case situation, as it exposes the inability of the US to win a conventional war against a near peer. This in turn makes a war with China much less likely and hopefully puts our country on a path to normalcy (and away from messianic behavior). From the perspective of the American government, the loss in and of Ukraine is a catastrophe, for the same reasons I outlined.
Everyone, and especially the readers here, know that the Ukraine will lose this war. The question is only how badly. The citizens of the West and Ukraine. will be in shock, once they found out how many people have been killed or crippled. I say citizens because the politicians in both areas clearly don't care.
But the real question will be how Russia will react to all this and how their relationship with Europe will develop. I have to admit, Putin appears sane and calculated when he talks about Europe and so far he hasn't retaliated that much. That can change once the war is over. Putin will probably demand the sanctions to end, which the West will probably not agree to. Then Russia will have to choice but to become a spoiler and mess with Europe and the US on all ends.
I wish you were right, but if the new government is CDU led, I'm afraid not much will change, simply because the CDU has been also very pro Ukraine and pushed Scholz to deliver more weapons. Only the German AFD is openly very much against a continuation of support, but the German media labels them as far right, making it more difficult for ordinary Germans to vote for them, because of the German history around WW2.
Perhaps, that's the big issue here, Europe may be sleepwalking again into the abyss, because their political leaders are not able to say no the uncle Sam and solve this on their own.
I am not an expert on German politics, but any future government almost certainly will be a coalition. Given the success of AfD and the unhappiness with the left wing socialists and greens, the deindustrialization of Germany, I think big change will come.
If this scenario plays out (direct Polish and British troops involvement), we are getting closer and closer in a pan-European war or -in other words- the official start of WW3.
The world would be a better place without England.
And whether NATO will retaliate once Russia nukes an entire. country like Poland, needs to be seen.
As a German, I wouldn't want to die because of Poland.
Which brings me to Scholz and Macron. Instead of trying to solve this crisis, they actually make things worse. Most Western politicians these days are a disappointment.
In 2012-2014 there were numerous stories in the MSM about Nazis in Ukraine. Not only Nuland, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were involved,meeting with AZOV and offering more aid and promises of US, NATO, Backing. Here is news from 2018 on Nazis:
The US will sacrifice Poles, UK troops and any nation that is willing to confront Russia. If anyone is paying attention the attacks in the Middle East are not in Iran. I have heard the Jordanians were involved in the attacks within Iraq. If so it is the setting up of another proxy to fight for the US along with Israel.
The real disaster isn't Ukraine, it's pushing Russia into an alliance with China and Iran that could have been avoided with greater geopolitical understanding. Kissinger would not have made this mistake.
If they move the capital to Lviv, what do you think would happen to the remainder of Ukraine that is not annexed by Russia? Would it be a demilitarized buffer state but still be “independent”? At this point, how many oblasts do you think Russia will want/can reasonably annex?
I think this article has a lot of good insight. I can't really see the upside for Putin to start an open ended conflict with NATO, not that I'm saying that's what you're saying. It's just that as you mentioned that a feature of this war has been the incorrect assumptions of overwhelming US technical superiority and wishful thinking that Russia would just give up could be added, in my opinion, an irrational hysteria that Putin is unavoidably bent on attacking NATO territory. Doesn't that knowledge account for some countries' loudmouth aggressiveness, knowing they probably won't have to back up the big talk on the field of battle? Have you seen evidence that Russians have built up an irresistible need to bloody some noses, even with the risk of starting a war? Might they get in a few hits, and get away with it, without starting a war? Thank you for your coverage of this subject.
My main worry is stumbling into a bigger war. If the Poles or Brits or both crossed into Ukrainian territory, the Russians would have little choice. Putin has been trying to avoid a wider conflict (Washington has been indifferent), but there always are limits. I agree with you that a lot of this is European and American irrational hysteria. But irrationality leads to blunders.
Russia drastically miscalculated in not using enough force to end the war quickly, before eurofools and their American enablers could paint themselves into a corner.
A lot of serious incidents start as relatively minor matters that escalate out of control as nobody can be seen to back down.
Putin told the Ukrainians some months ago that there were plans afoot for Poland to recover Volhynia from Ukraine and said something along the lines of he told them so and that they have what's coming to them. It sounded outrageous to me, given the history. For a primer on the region, watch the film Volyn, Hatred in English, it covers the issues clearly. I can't imagine that anyone wants to really tangle with Russia at the moment, or that Russia wants to do anything other than wrap this conflict up.
The idea that Poland would want a region inhabited by fractious well-armed people who are by no stretch of the imagination Polish and who have a history of genocide against Poles within living memory beggars belief.
But yes, this is in many ways a Catholic crusade against Orthodox Russia - there's a lot of that older East-West contest in the current conflict... and all the others before it.
The picture that is emerging on the front line in eastern Ukraine is one of both sides reaching a stage of absolute exhaustion. This is the stage not unlike where Germany was in 1917, and why the Kaiser shipped Lenin back to Russia, because Lenin would use the war as a pretext for revolution and then make any sort of peace with Germany.
If Germany had managed to persuade the US not to commit to the Allies (if the Zimmerman Telegram had both been kept secret and been successful), Germany might have succeeded in breaking the French Army and forcing a surrender. The French were that exhausted.
In Ukraine, Russia has no other front in which to craft a quick peace. Russia has no other ally who will inject fresh troops. How much actual military power does Putin have left, and if it's substantial, why isn't he using it?
I understand your point but don't agree. The Russians have between 350,000 to 500,000 trained men they could commit to fight but have not yet. I don't think they are sitting around waiting to get sun tanned,
I've seen that estimate tossed about for months, and yet those troops are not being deployed.
It makes no strategic sense to delay a major offensive. Whatever troops Russia had last summer is more than they have now. The mathematics of attritional warfare don't allow for any alternative scenario.
The longer Putin delays an offensive the more attritional warfare will reduce the capabilities for that offensive. Trench warfare is not a strategy for victory. It wasn't in 1917 and it still isn't in 2024.
If Putin has the troops, why is he not using them?
Having the forces there and doing nothing with them is functionally equivalent of not having the forces there at all.
If the personnel is there, then we must look for another limiting factor which prevents their use in a major offensive. What is holding Russia back? Whatever is holding Russia back is effectively neutralizing those 350,000 to 500,000 troops. If Russia cannot overcome whatever strategic or logistical impediment is preventing the deployment and use of those 350,000-500,000 troops, then those troops might as well not exist, which means that Russia's effective troop strength does NOT include those 350,000-500,000 troops.
The longer Russia goes without using those troops to gain the upper hand and end this conflict, the more likely it is that something is preventing their use, and that does not bode well for Russia.
Potentially, Russia might be able to outlast Ukraine in this attritional war that NATO is determined to extend as long as possible. Even if they do, what are the odds Russia has the military capacity afterwards to project any power anywhere, especially in Europe? If Russia cannot project military power in Europe because the war with Ukraine has exhausted its war-fighting capacity, on what basis can we say Russia "won" the war in Ukraine? A Pyrrhic victory is generally understood to be no victory at all.
I think it is not too complicated. The Russians appear to have decided to bleed Ukraine first and attack after the bleeding was finished. That way, fewer casualties, but the price is it takes time. Also the Russian army is very conservative --that was the big fight with Prigozhin who was willing to sacrifice thousands of men. Now the Russians have learned better tactics and have better equipment, so they can carry out an offensive on their timetable.
This assumes that Russia is also not bleeding. That is at best a charitable assumption, but more likely an unrealistic one.
And Prigozhin was not the only commander willing to do human wave attacks. Shoygu and Gerasimov are also rather fond of so-called "meat attacks". Surovikin was the one general who actively tried to conserve Russian forces and minimize casualties and he got sacked after the Prigozhin affair.
IF Russia is not bleeding, then maybe your thesis works. Historically, attritional war means both sides bleed, and it's an endurance contest as to which side collapses first from the blood loss. In 1917 Russia collapsed first to Germany, and in 1918 Germany collapsed first to the Allies (which got a last minute infusion of fresh "blood" in the form of the American Expeditionary Force).
Ukraine may "lose" the endurance contest, but the end result is a bled and bloodied Russian military, which means NATO wins by achieving its strategic objective--a degraded and largely exhausted Russian military. I've said it before, NATO's strategy is as simple as it is cynical: NATO provides the cannons, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. And no, NATO does not give one tinker's damn whether Ukraine "wins" or not. What matters to NATO is that Russia loses troops--and so far NATO has been getting what they want.
Question. Are you equating "forces" to the number of troops? From the above discussion it seems like you are, correct me if I am wrong. The reason I am asking is that I am reading all the reports that Russian MIC is still accelerating, i.e., it is not just producing, but each month producing more than it produced a month before. Not sure how true those reports are, but if they are, would not it mean that at the same number of troops the force is actually increasing because, say, you have more and more tanks, or drones, artillery etc? Especially considering that Ukraine is not getting as much theses days as it was getting before the counter-offensive of summer of 2023.
The estimate that Stephen Bryan is reiterating is one that has been floating around several narratives on the Ukraine conflict for several months--which is that Russia has 350,000-500,000 troops (men) in reserve.
The great unanswered question is if Russia has that many troops in reserve, why have they not launched a new offensive to take Kharkiv, or perhaps another decapitation strike at Kyiv? 350,000 troops in reserve is roughly double what they launched the invasion with. So why have they not used them before now?
Is the Russian MIC gaining speed? There are a number of reports to that effect. The great challenge is--and this was what doomed the German effort in 1918--is whether the civilian economy can be sustained as well. If the civilian economy collapses too far, especially without a significant victory or offensive, at some point the Russian people are going to say "enough". That was what happened in February 1917 when the Mensheviks forced the Tsar to abdicate. The Russian army was still viable in the field, but the Russian people were getting the short end of the MIC stick.
Does Russia have complete control over the timetable? No. That does not happen in the real world. If Russia does not generate an offensive in the relatively near future, especially if Ukraine is able to maintain moderate control of the skies with their drones, there is a point beyond which even Putin's image as a strong leader is going to not be enough. And Putin does not control where that point is--he needs something that looks like a significant victory, and the longer he goes without that the greater that need becomes.
The same pattern of assumptions that says Russia wins is the same pattern of assumptions that said Germany would win in 1918. That pattern did not work then, we should not be so quick to believe it will work now.
All this abstract discussion of numbers (troops, shells, drones, planes, armour &c) doesn't take into account the concrete situation(s) along the line of contact.
You could send an extra 100,000 Russian infantry to Adviivka, but it would just get very overcrowded in the actual trenches there.
The concrete dynamics of force in a specific location is what matters, which is why I find all the abstract debates about numbers, and Stephen's idea of NATO's proxy suddenly retreating to the Dnieper so unrealistic.
Perhaps Zelensky's attempted coup against Zaluzhny, Klitschko, Poroshenko and others will fail and morale will suddenly collapse.
But right now, I don't think Putin has any chance of taking even Kramatorsk.
@Peter. Russia is holding back because it's not there to gain much territory but to kill as many Ukrainian soldiers as possible. This way the civilians casualties are kept low (they are very low compared to other conflicts) and the Ukrainian army is being bled out. Time is on Russia's side because the West has no Wunderwaffe, and NATO can't produce enough weapons. Why risk the deaths of thousands of you own soldiers if you can grind down Ukraine?
After the war, Russia will tell everyone "Look what it means to become a US proxy. They dropped you like a hot potato with no mercy while your country suffered 1 Mio casualties".
Also, Russia may hope Trump will come back, so the conflict can be solved without having to start a major offensive.
With Russian casualties already in the hundreds of thousands, Ukraine is not the only army being bled out.
The conceit and thus the flaw in attritional warfare is that you be able to inflict greater casualties than you suffer. WW1 is an object lesson in the folly of attritional warfare.
The additional flaw in the strategy you are suggesting is that NATO doesn't need a Ukrainian "victory". A stalemate serves NATO objectives far more than a Ukrainian victory. If Ukraine inflicts another few hundred thousand casualties on Russia before finally collapsing, Russia's military is effectively neutered for the next several years--at a time when instability across Russia's very large border makes an exhausted military a very dangerous condition for Russia. Azerbaijan has already taken advantage of Russian weakness to seize Nagorno-Karabakh, and the rest of the Caucasus region is being pulled apart by Iran and Turkey.
None of this augurs well for Russia's future security. Russian security interests extend well past Ukraine, but Ukraine is soaking up the majority of Russian military assets. That's not good for Russia.
If Russia is "holding back" then Shoygu and Gerasimov are even more incompetent than they have shown themselves to be to date. War is not a time for restraint.
I can easily believe the Russian people do not want this war.
Putin himself might really and truly want an off ramp to end the war.
His problem is getting there.
Even if Ukraine cedes the four oblasts Russia "annexed", that makes Russia's security situation worse than before the invasion. There's a longer border with Ukraine, a less defensible border, and fewer troops to secure that border.
If Putin pulls back to Russia proper, then he's fought a bloody attritional war for nothing. How does he stay in power in the Kremlin in that scenario? Russia is already losing sway in the Caucasus, which further complicates Russia's long term security outlook.
Putin needs to be seen as "winning", but the one scenario open to him where that happens he has to wage another war within the next few years to take the rest of Ukraine. And it's a good bet that Victoria Nuland and her colleagues in Foggy Bottom can see that as well. Which means they either a) push to add Ukraine to NATO or b) put NATO troops on the new Ukrainian border with Russia.
It's one thing not to want a war. The question is how badly does Putin want peace?
This assumes a lot of facts not in evidence, such as that a post-war Ukraine will be able to mount an offensive against Russia, when they already tried and failed epically.
It also fails to explain numerous facts in evidence, such as why Russia dithered for eight years trying to get Ukraine to abide by Minsk-2, why Russia used so little force and was so quick to seek negotiations before BoJo scuttled them.
Who said anything about Ukraine mounting an offensive?
Russia's security strategy since the days of Catherine the Great has been to expand to defensible geographic borders and forward position troops in the relevant gaps. Ukraine is on the wrong side of two of those gaps.
Ukraine doesn't have to mount an offensive, but Russia does, or they need a new security doctrine.
Putin aimed for a decapitation strike and blitzkrieg war that would be over in weeks if not days. When his troops failed to take Kyiv quickly, his entire strategy failed, leaving him stuck in the situation he's in now.
That is why the NATO side torpedoed peace talks. NATO can bleed Russia without risking a single NATO soldier, and that's exactly what they have been doing. Arguably successfully.
While I agree thst Russia drastically miscalculated in not using enough force to settle the issue decisively, you're the one who said that Russia had a more difficult security situation, even if Ukraine ceded the four oblasts.
A more difficult security situation vis-a-vis whom?
With Ukraine's sovereign borders as established in 1992, ceding the four oblasts extends Russia's border with Ukraine by several hundred miles. This is all open terrain, with no natural geographic formations (mountains or rivers) to impede an invading army.
On the eastern side of Ukraine is the Carpathian mountain chain. This reduces that border to the border with Poland to the north and the Bessarabian gap to the south as the only places where any army of any size can move. These are far shorter borders that have to be defended, and thus require far fewer troops.
Russia's border if the front line were frozen where it is now and everything to the east of it ceded to Russia is demonstrably a more difficult frontier to defend, and a longer frontier to defend, than Russia had in January of 2022.
Russia needed to take all of Ukraine for this war to work out successfully for Putin. Taking just the eastern third just isn't enough.
Bear in mind, if Russia were not concerned about defensible borders, you again come back to the same starting position of Russia having no casus belli for invading Ukraine in February of 2022. If Russia had legitimate concerns about its security (which, to be fair, they did and do), a war for just part of Ukraine does not resolve any of those concerns. If you argue the security concerns you have to also argue for Russia taking all of Ukraine, because that is how they resolve them. Without all of Ukraine, none of those security concerns are resolved--and that means Russia will in short order have to fight another war or do a top-to-bottom rethink of its security doctrine.
Given that this same war pushed Sweden and Finland out of their historic neutrality into NATO, and thus assured that all of the Baltic is now a NATO lake, in the event of a war with NATO, Russia's Baltic Fleet is effectively neutered. Moreover, the inclusion of Finland in NATO expands the border Russia must defend to the north by more than 800 miles. More border means less security.
Remember, Russia sent troops into Ukraine. That one fact is not open to any debate or dispute. Russia invaded Ukraine. The only way that invasion makes sense is if Russia takes all of Ukraine, which at this point is proving to be considerably beyond Russia's grasp. That's a problem for Russia, and an existential problem for Putin.
That assumes that China can actually invade Taiwan.
Signature difference between Russia and China: Russia actually had some combat seasoned troops and officers. China has none. Their military capacity is strictly theoretical
Yeah everyone keeps going on about the invasion of Taiwan.
But the one thing no one can get around is the Malacca Strait. 75% of China's total oil consumption flows through that choke point, and China has no way to defend against a blockade there. Even their hypersonic missiles are ineffective that far from China proper.
China invades Taiwan, the US and India shut down China's oil supply (Russia is already delivering all it can through the ESPO pipeline). China runs out of oil in three months, the lights go out in six months, and industry collapses in 12 months.
India by itself has the naval assets to shut down China's oil supply, and almost certainly will (defending Taiwan would be the perfect casus belli for India to take on China in a theater where India holds all the advantages).
Unless China has a war game scenario where they can maintain a supply line across the Taiwan Strait with coal instead of oil for the ships, China has no chance at keeping Taiwan even if they take Taiwan.
I suspect that the surprises that Nuland spoke of include more and longer-range missiles and terrorism, unless and until the call goes out to Send In The Poles.
No, Poles won't be enthusiastic about this, but nobody will ask them.
Nuland usually goes to Kyiv to organize new leadership.
I guess this time she gave her blessing to psychopath Budanov to finish the war by any means, rather than contemplate 'active defense' and possible compromise like his rival Zaluzhny.
Not clear to me that there's any meaningful political pressure currently on leadership in Moscow. That's thanks in large part Ukraine's peculiar targeting choices for "vengance strikes", resulting in Russians losing all sympathy for them. Since the consolidation at the end of 2022, Russia seems to have been limiting the pace to a roughly steady rate of intensity. Doing so is part of the reason there isn't political pressure.
Regarding the leadership drama in Kiev. I'd have to think it's less about assigning blame for political reasons. There are no elections there, and I don't think there will be until the war ends. There are substantial spoils to be divided up, however. And there is still some consolidation of power left to do, though that's largely done I think.
For consolidation of power, in terms of ideology, the Stepan Bandera fan club seem to rule the roost across the spectrum of gov and mil. Likewise, the transformation of the population, alas, seems to be a done deal. People who objected when street signs and city squares got the names of WWII war criminals - they're now a definite minority. Especially among the able-bodied-men demographic.
The remaining consolidation left to do, is that some of the legacy oligarchs still haven't been fully displaced. That consolidation may be something Nuland can put on the table. I dunno. Plus the money, of course. US congress presumably will get to work. It takes a special kind of ultranationalist to herd another half a million unwilling men to the trenches, and they aren't going to do it for free.
postscript - at least some US hawks, via the Atlantic Council, published an op/ed in the WSJ - "A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine", 04 FEB 2024.
New vision = indefinite but limited conflict ; Which I think would meet the minimal business needs of the Kiev regime, extending their profitable emergency and (in theory) saving them from losing the war, though the op-ed authors do express a desire to reduce funding from by US.
- "We doubt this approach would result in a negotiated peace treaty or even a formal cease-fire agreement. It could nevertheless result in a de facto stalemate with an active but static line of contact between the two militaries and far less combat."
- "NATO membership is off the table at least until there is a stable line of separation between Ukrainian and Russian forces and reduced conflict."
- They advocate US supplying long-enough-range weapons to target into Russia, which obviously means the conflict wouldn't be reduced
I am happy that the Americans and NATO are losing. Ukrainians were led down the Primrose Path, for them it’s a terrible tragedy and a sorry thing to watch. There’s been talk about rounding up, fighting age Ukrainian males in Europe and bringing them back to fight. That would be a comedy of errors. God help you if American Empire becomes interested in your country; The political Gnosticism of the liberal imperium will get you killed.
I am not happy at all. Our deterrent has been weakened and NATO is damaged.
I’m conflicted.
The global American empire is pernicious. They created this war by encroaching on Russia. The cynically used the Ukraine and sent their boys to die. The Russians are standing up to American hegemony. That’s why I’m enjoying Americans getting a blackeye. Why did Americans want to take down the Russians? I say political Gnosticism. Their democracy promotion is a nonsense. Everywhere they go they lay waste.
So why am I conflicted?
Why am I a traitor to my own interests? The Americans are a bunch of assholes on the world stage. Yet here I sit in southwest Florida. Hum.
Isn’t the loss of Ukraine at least a neutral? No more BS about NATO readiness or invincibility. No more whining about EC’s 2% contribution. Its sh*t or get off the pot time. once again we prove to all, politicians cannot be trusted.
after you invest between $100 and $200 billion, possibly cause WW3, it is hard to see the loss of Ukraine as a neutral
in my opinion, the long knives will be out, if they are not already
Thanks for the reply. Good points.
Neutral is neither good nor bad. Right?
WWIII has not started and obviously NATO members do not think that would be worthwhile.
Or maybe even winnable.
NATO now has been given a clear view what they will face if/when Putin decides to resume his quest for reconstructing his empire.
All the early happy talk could not change the fact that Ukraine could not win a protracted war with Russia. If that took $100-200 billion (and 500,000 Ukrainians) to learn, then bad on us.
Especially bad on us if as you say Biden wants to waste more US taxpayer money and Ukrainian blood by waiting until after November election. Proxy wars are always evil, but that is no less than a mortal sin.
From my perspective, the loss in and of Ukraine is the best case situation, as it exposes the inability of the US to win a conventional war against a near peer. This in turn makes a war with China much less likely and hopefully puts our country on a path to normalcy (and away from messianic behavior). From the perspective of the American government, the loss in and of Ukraine is a catastrophe, for the same reasons I outlined.
I really enjoy your articles. First found them on asiatimes and now read them directly on here.
Many thanks
Everyone, and especially the readers here, know that the Ukraine will lose this war. The question is only how badly. The citizens of the West and Ukraine. will be in shock, once they found out how many people have been killed or crippled. I say citizens because the politicians in both areas clearly don't care.
But the real question will be how Russia will react to all this and how their relationship with Europe will develop. I have to admit, Putin appears sane and calculated when he talks about Europe and so far he hasn't retaliated that much. That can change once the war is over. Putin will probably demand the sanctions to end, which the West will probably not agree to. Then Russia will have to choice but to become a spoiler and mess with Europe and the US on all ends.
I think Europe, led by Germany, will be anxious for a reconciliation (once Germany has a new government, which is very likely)
I wish you were right, but if the new government is CDU led, I'm afraid not much will change, simply because the CDU has been also very pro Ukraine and pushed Scholz to deliver more weapons. Only the German AFD is openly very much against a continuation of support, but the German media labels them as far right, making it more difficult for ordinary Germans to vote for them, because of the German history around WW2.
Perhaps, that's the big issue here, Europe may be sleepwalking again into the abyss, because their political leaders are not able to say no the uncle Sam and solve this on their own.
I am not an expert on German politics, but any future government almost certainly will be a coalition. Given the success of AfD and the unhappiness with the left wing socialists and greens, the deindustrialization of Germany, I think big change will come.
Neither am I, although I lived in Germany for 25 years. Let's hope the best!
If this scenario plays out (direct Polish and British troops involvement), we are getting closer and closer in a pan-European war or -in other words- the official start of WW3.
The world would be a better place without England.
And whether NATO will retaliate once Russia nukes an entire. country like Poland, needs to be seen.
As a German, I wouldn't want to die because of Poland.
Which brings me to Scholz and Macron. Instead of trying to solve this crisis, they actually make things worse. Most Western politicians these days are a disappointment.
In 2012-2014 there were numerous stories in the MSM about Nazis in Ukraine. Not only Nuland, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were involved,meeting with AZOV and offering more aid and promises of US, NATO, Backing. Here is news from 2018 on Nazis:
https://therealnews.com/the-us-is-arming-and-assisting-neo-nazis-in-ukraine-while-congress-debates-prohibition
The US will sacrifice Poles, UK troops and any nation that is willing to confront Russia. If anyone is paying attention the attacks in the Middle East are not in Iran. I have heard the Jordanians were involved in the attacks within Iraq. If so it is the setting up of another proxy to fight for the US along with Israel.
The real disaster isn't Ukraine, it's pushing Russia into an alliance with China and Iran that could have been avoided with greater geopolitical understanding. Kissinger would not have made this mistake.
If they move the capital to Lviv, what do you think would happen to the remainder of Ukraine that is not annexed by Russia? Would it be a demilitarized buffer state but still be “independent”? At this point, how many oblasts do you think Russia will want/can reasonably annex?
great questions but I don't have good answers
I think this article has a lot of good insight. I can't really see the upside for Putin to start an open ended conflict with NATO, not that I'm saying that's what you're saying. It's just that as you mentioned that a feature of this war has been the incorrect assumptions of overwhelming US technical superiority and wishful thinking that Russia would just give up could be added, in my opinion, an irrational hysteria that Putin is unavoidably bent on attacking NATO territory. Doesn't that knowledge account for some countries' loudmouth aggressiveness, knowing they probably won't have to back up the big talk on the field of battle? Have you seen evidence that Russians have built up an irresistible need to bloody some noses, even with the risk of starting a war? Might they get in a few hits, and get away with it, without starting a war? Thank you for your coverage of this subject.
My main worry is stumbling into a bigger war. If the Poles or Brits or both crossed into Ukrainian territory, the Russians would have little choice. Putin has been trying to avoid a wider conflict (Washington has been indifferent), but there always are limits. I agree with you that a lot of this is European and American irrational hysteria. But irrationality leads to blunders.
Russia drastically miscalculated in not using enough force to end the war quickly, before eurofools and their American enablers could paint themselves into a corner.
A lot of serious incidents start as relatively minor matters that escalate out of control as nobody can be seen to back down.
Putin told the Ukrainians some months ago that there were plans afoot for Poland to recover Volhynia from Ukraine and said something along the lines of he told them so and that they have what's coming to them. It sounded outrageous to me, given the history. For a primer on the region, watch the film Volyn, Hatred in English, it covers the issues clearly. I can't imagine that anyone wants to really tangle with Russia at the moment, or that Russia wants to do anything other than wrap this conflict up.
The idea that Poland would want a region inhabited by fractious well-armed people who are by no stretch of the imagination Polish and who have a history of genocide against Poles within living memory beggars belief.
I agree but that is not what they are saying
I don't think Poland is talking annexation. More like a crusade.
you get dead either way
The Teutonic Knights tried that.
Saint Alexander Nevsky got help from Asia.
But yes, this is in many ways a Catholic crusade against Orthodox Russia - there's a lot of that older East-West contest in the current conflict... and all the others before it.
all true, but when you make a wrong move you pay
The presumption here is that Russia can mount a major offensive.
The problem is that they have not done so despite the partial mobilization.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/but-can-they-fight
The picture that is emerging on the front line in eastern Ukraine is one of both sides reaching a stage of absolute exhaustion. This is the stage not unlike where Germany was in 1917, and why the Kaiser shipped Lenin back to Russia, because Lenin would use the war as a pretext for revolution and then make any sort of peace with Germany.
If Germany had managed to persuade the US not to commit to the Allies (if the Zimmerman Telegram had both been kept secret and been successful), Germany might have succeeded in breaking the French Army and forcing a surrender. The French were that exhausted.
In Ukraine, Russia has no other front in which to craft a quick peace. Russia has no other ally who will inject fresh troops. How much actual military power does Putin have left, and if it's substantial, why isn't he using it?
I understand your point but don't agree. The Russians have between 350,000 to 500,000 trained men they could commit to fight but have not yet. I don't think they are sitting around waiting to get sun tanned,
I've seen that estimate tossed about for months, and yet those troops are not being deployed.
It makes no strategic sense to delay a major offensive. Whatever troops Russia had last summer is more than they have now. The mathematics of attritional warfare don't allow for any alternative scenario.
The longer Putin delays an offensive the more attritional warfare will reduce the capabilities for that offensive. Trench warfare is not a strategy for victory. It wasn't in 1917 and it still isn't in 2024.
If Putin has the troops, why is he not using them?
You need to consult with the Russian Army. I report was is there, not what they do with it.
Having the forces there and doing nothing with them is functionally equivalent of not having the forces there at all.
If the personnel is there, then we must look for another limiting factor which prevents their use in a major offensive. What is holding Russia back? Whatever is holding Russia back is effectively neutralizing those 350,000 to 500,000 troops. If Russia cannot overcome whatever strategic or logistical impediment is preventing the deployment and use of those 350,000-500,000 troops, then those troops might as well not exist, which means that Russia's effective troop strength does NOT include those 350,000-500,000 troops.
The longer Russia goes without using those troops to gain the upper hand and end this conflict, the more likely it is that something is preventing their use, and that does not bode well for Russia.
Potentially, Russia might be able to outlast Ukraine in this attritional war that NATO is determined to extend as long as possible. Even if they do, what are the odds Russia has the military capacity afterwards to project any power anywhere, especially in Europe? If Russia cannot project military power in Europe because the war with Ukraine has exhausted its war-fighting capacity, on what basis can we say Russia "won" the war in Ukraine? A Pyrrhic victory is generally understood to be no victory at all.
I think it is not too complicated. The Russians appear to have decided to bleed Ukraine first and attack after the bleeding was finished. That way, fewer casualties, but the price is it takes time. Also the Russian army is very conservative --that was the big fight with Prigozhin who was willing to sacrifice thousands of men. Now the Russians have learned better tactics and have better equipment, so they can carry out an offensive on their timetable.
This assumes that Russia is also not bleeding. That is at best a charitable assumption, but more likely an unrealistic one.
And Prigozhin was not the only commander willing to do human wave attacks. Shoygu and Gerasimov are also rather fond of so-called "meat attacks". Surovikin was the one general who actively tried to conserve Russian forces and minimize casualties and he got sacked after the Prigozhin affair.
IF Russia is not bleeding, then maybe your thesis works. Historically, attritional war means both sides bleed, and it's an endurance contest as to which side collapses first from the blood loss. In 1917 Russia collapsed first to Germany, and in 1918 Germany collapsed first to the Allies (which got a last minute infusion of fresh "blood" in the form of the American Expeditionary Force).
Ukraine may "lose" the endurance contest, but the end result is a bled and bloodied Russian military, which means NATO wins by achieving its strategic objective--a degraded and largely exhausted Russian military. I've said it before, NATO's strategy is as simple as it is cynical: NATO provides the cannons, Ukraine provides the cannon fodder. And no, NATO does not give one tinker's damn whether Ukraine "wins" or not. What matters to NATO is that Russia loses troops--and so far NATO has been getting what they want.
Question. Are you equating "forces" to the number of troops? From the above discussion it seems like you are, correct me if I am wrong. The reason I am asking is that I am reading all the reports that Russian MIC is still accelerating, i.e., it is not just producing, but each month producing more than it produced a month before. Not sure how true those reports are, but if they are, would not it mean that at the same number of troops the force is actually increasing because, say, you have more and more tanks, or drones, artillery etc? Especially considering that Ukraine is not getting as much theses days as it was getting before the counter-offensive of summer of 2023.
The estimate that Stephen Bryan is reiterating is one that has been floating around several narratives on the Ukraine conflict for several months--which is that Russia has 350,000-500,000 troops (men) in reserve.
The great unanswered question is if Russia has that many troops in reserve, why have they not launched a new offensive to take Kharkiv, or perhaps another decapitation strike at Kyiv? 350,000 troops in reserve is roughly double what they launched the invasion with. So why have they not used them before now?
Is the Russian MIC gaining speed? There are a number of reports to that effect. The great challenge is--and this was what doomed the German effort in 1918--is whether the civilian economy can be sustained as well. If the civilian economy collapses too far, especially without a significant victory or offensive, at some point the Russian people are going to say "enough". That was what happened in February 1917 when the Mensheviks forced the Tsar to abdicate. The Russian army was still viable in the field, but the Russian people were getting the short end of the MIC stick.
Does Russia have complete control over the timetable? No. That does not happen in the real world. If Russia does not generate an offensive in the relatively near future, especially if Ukraine is able to maintain moderate control of the skies with their drones, there is a point beyond which even Putin's image as a strong leader is going to not be enough. And Putin does not control where that point is--he needs something that looks like a significant victory, and the longer he goes without that the greater that need becomes.
The same pattern of assumptions that says Russia wins is the same pattern of assumptions that said Germany would win in 1918. That pattern did not work then, we should not be so quick to believe it will work now.
All this abstract discussion of numbers (troops, shells, drones, planes, armour &c) doesn't take into account the concrete situation(s) along the line of contact.
You could send an extra 100,000 Russian infantry to Adviivka, but it would just get very overcrowded in the actual trenches there.
The concrete dynamics of force in a specific location is what matters, which is why I find all the abstract debates about numbers, and Stephen's idea of NATO's proxy suddenly retreating to the Dnieper so unrealistic.
Perhaps Zelensky's attempted coup against Zaluzhny, Klitschko, Poroshenko and others will fail and morale will suddenly collapse.
But right now, I don't think Putin has any chance of taking even Kramatorsk.
@Peter. Russia is holding back because it's not there to gain much territory but to kill as many Ukrainian soldiers as possible. This way the civilians casualties are kept low (they are very low compared to other conflicts) and the Ukrainian army is being bled out. Time is on Russia's side because the West has no Wunderwaffe, and NATO can't produce enough weapons. Why risk the deaths of thousands of you own soldiers if you can grind down Ukraine?
After the war, Russia will tell everyone "Look what it means to become a US proxy. They dropped you like a hot potato with no mercy while your country suffered 1 Mio casualties".
Also, Russia may hope Trump will come back, so the conflict can be solved without having to start a major offensive.
With Russian casualties already in the hundreds of thousands, Ukraine is not the only army being bled out.
The conceit and thus the flaw in attritional warfare is that you be able to inflict greater casualties than you suffer. WW1 is an object lesson in the folly of attritional warfare.
The additional flaw in the strategy you are suggesting is that NATO doesn't need a Ukrainian "victory". A stalemate serves NATO objectives far more than a Ukrainian victory. If Ukraine inflicts another few hundred thousand casualties on Russia before finally collapsing, Russia's military is effectively neutered for the next several years--at a time when instability across Russia's very large border makes an exhausted military a very dangerous condition for Russia. Azerbaijan has already taken advantage of Russian weakness to seize Nagorno-Karabakh, and the rest of the Caucasus region is being pulled apart by Iran and Turkey.
None of this augurs well for Russia's future security. Russian security interests extend well past Ukraine, but Ukraine is soaking up the majority of Russian military assets. That's not good for Russia.
If Russia is "holding back" then Shoygu and Gerasimov are even more incompetent than they have shown themselves to be to date. War is not a time for restraint.
Because Russia really does not want this war and the Russian leadership is hoping that Ukraine can be brought to reason.
This is foolish on the part of the Russian leadership.
My guess is that they have figured this out
I hope so but events have given me little confidence.
I can easily believe the Russian people do not want this war.
Putin himself might really and truly want an off ramp to end the war.
His problem is getting there.
Even if Ukraine cedes the four oblasts Russia "annexed", that makes Russia's security situation worse than before the invasion. There's a longer border with Ukraine, a less defensible border, and fewer troops to secure that border.
If Putin pulls back to Russia proper, then he's fought a bloody attritional war for nothing. How does he stay in power in the Kremlin in that scenario? Russia is already losing sway in the Caucasus, which further complicates Russia's long term security outlook.
https://newsletter.allfactsmatter.us/p/will-russias-next-battlefield-be
Putin needs to be seen as "winning", but the one scenario open to him where that happens he has to wage another war within the next few years to take the rest of Ukraine. And it's a good bet that Victoria Nuland and her colleagues in Foggy Bottom can see that as well. Which means they either a) push to add Ukraine to NATO or b) put NATO troops on the new Ukrainian border with Russia.
It's one thing not to want a war. The question is how badly does Putin want peace?
This assumes a lot of facts not in evidence, such as that a post-war Ukraine will be able to mount an offensive against Russia, when they already tried and failed epically.
It also fails to explain numerous facts in evidence, such as why Russia dithered for eight years trying to get Ukraine to abide by Minsk-2, why Russia used so little force and was so quick to seek negotiations before BoJo scuttled them.
Who said anything about Ukraine mounting an offensive?
Russia's security strategy since the days of Catherine the Great has been to expand to defensible geographic borders and forward position troops in the relevant gaps. Ukraine is on the wrong side of two of those gaps.
Ukraine doesn't have to mount an offensive, but Russia does, or they need a new security doctrine.
Putin aimed for a decapitation strike and blitzkrieg war that would be over in weeks if not days. When his troops failed to take Kyiv quickly, his entire strategy failed, leaving him stuck in the situation he's in now.
That is why the NATO side torpedoed peace talks. NATO can bleed Russia without risking a single NATO soldier, and that's exactly what they have been doing. Arguably successfully.
While I agree thst Russia drastically miscalculated in not using enough force to settle the issue decisively, you're the one who said that Russia had a more difficult security situation, even if Ukraine ceded the four oblasts.
A more difficult security situation vis-a-vis whom?
Vis-a-vis geography.
With Ukraine's sovereign borders as established in 1992, ceding the four oblasts extends Russia's border with Ukraine by several hundred miles. This is all open terrain, with no natural geographic formations (mountains or rivers) to impede an invading army.
On the eastern side of Ukraine is the Carpathian mountain chain. This reduces that border to the border with Poland to the north and the Bessarabian gap to the south as the only places where any army of any size can move. These are far shorter borders that have to be defended, and thus require far fewer troops.
Russia's border if the front line were frozen where it is now and everything to the east of it ceded to Russia is demonstrably a more difficult frontier to defend, and a longer frontier to defend, than Russia had in January of 2022.
Russia needed to take all of Ukraine for this war to work out successfully for Putin. Taking just the eastern third just isn't enough.
Bear in mind, if Russia were not concerned about defensible borders, you again come back to the same starting position of Russia having no casus belli for invading Ukraine in February of 2022. If Russia had legitimate concerns about its security (which, to be fair, they did and do), a war for just part of Ukraine does not resolve any of those concerns. If you argue the security concerns you have to also argue for Russia taking all of Ukraine, because that is how they resolve them. Without all of Ukraine, none of those security concerns are resolved--and that means Russia will in short order have to fight another war or do a top-to-bottom rethink of its security doctrine.
Given that this same war pushed Sweden and Finland out of their historic neutrality into NATO, and thus assured that all of the Baltic is now a NATO lake, in the event of a war with NATO, Russia's Baltic Fleet is effectively neutered. Moreover, the inclusion of Finland in NATO expands the border Russia must defend to the north by more than 800 miles. More border means less security.
Remember, Russia sent troops into Ukraine. That one fact is not open to any debate or dispute. Russia invaded Ukraine. The only way that invasion makes sense is if Russia takes all of Ukraine, which at this point is proving to be considerably beyond Russia's grasp. That's a problem for Russia, and an existential problem for Putin.
Nuland is only *acting* no. 2 at State.
Biden has already nominated a China hawk to replace her.
Ukraine was only a warm-up for Taiwan.
That assumes that China can actually invade Taiwan.
Signature difference between Russia and China: Russia actually had some combat seasoned troops and officers. China has none. Their military capacity is strictly theoretical
Tell that to the guys in Washington and Taipei wargaming the invasion all last year.
Yeah everyone keeps going on about the invasion of Taiwan.
But the one thing no one can get around is the Malacca Strait. 75% of China's total oil consumption flows through that choke point, and China has no way to defend against a blockade there. Even their hypersonic missiles are ineffective that far from China proper.
China invades Taiwan, the US and India shut down China's oil supply (Russia is already delivering all it can through the ESPO pipeline). China runs out of oil in three months, the lights go out in six months, and industry collapses in 12 months.
India by itself has the naval assets to shut down China's oil supply, and almost certainly will (defending Taiwan would be the perfect casus belli for India to take on China in a theater where India holds all the advantages).
Unless China has a war game scenario where they can maintain a supply line across the Taiwan Strait with coal instead of oil for the ships, China has no chance at keeping Taiwan even if they take Taiwan.
I suspect that the surprises that Nuland spoke of include more and longer-range missiles and terrorism, unless and until the call goes out to Send In The Poles.
No, Poles won't be enthusiastic about this, but nobody will ask them.
Nuland usually goes to Kyiv to organize new leadership.
I guess this time she gave her blessing to psychopath Budanov to finish the war by any means, rather than contemplate 'active defense' and possible compromise like his rival Zaluzhny.
Possible.
Again, well done Stephen, but again, I have to say we need to bug out and pursue a neutralist foreign policy.
Not clear to me that there's any meaningful political pressure currently on leadership in Moscow. That's thanks in large part Ukraine's peculiar targeting choices for "vengance strikes", resulting in Russians losing all sympathy for them. Since the consolidation at the end of 2022, Russia seems to have been limiting the pace to a roughly steady rate of intensity. Doing so is part of the reason there isn't political pressure.
Regarding the leadership drama in Kiev. I'd have to think it's less about assigning blame for political reasons. There are no elections there, and I don't think there will be until the war ends. There are substantial spoils to be divided up, however. And there is still some consolidation of power left to do, though that's largely done I think.
For consolidation of power, in terms of ideology, the Stepan Bandera fan club seem to rule the roost across the spectrum of gov and mil. Likewise, the transformation of the population, alas, seems to be a done deal. People who objected when street signs and city squares got the names of WWII war criminals - they're now a definite minority. Especially among the able-bodied-men demographic.
The remaining consolidation left to do, is that some of the legacy oligarchs still haven't been fully displaced. That consolidation may be something Nuland can put on the table. I dunno. Plus the money, of course. US congress presumably will get to work. It takes a special kind of ultranationalist to herd another half a million unwilling men to the trenches, and they aren't going to do it for free.
postscript - at least some US hawks, via the Atlantic Council, published an op/ed in the WSJ - "A New Strategy Can Save Ukraine", 04 FEB 2024.
New vision = indefinite but limited conflict ; Which I think would meet the minimal business needs of the Kiev regime, extending their profitable emergency and (in theory) saving them from losing the war, though the op-ed authors do express a desire to reduce funding from by US.
- "We doubt this approach would result in a negotiated peace treaty or even a formal cease-fire agreement. It could nevertheless result in a de facto stalemate with an active but static line of contact between the two militaries and far less combat."
- "NATO membership is off the table at least until there is a stable line of separation between Ukrainian and Russian forces and reduced conflict."
- They advocate US supplying long-enough-range weapons to target into Russia, which obviously means the conflict wouldn't be reduced
Very interesting i look forward to your write-ups thanks
You are using unacceptable language.