So far, the US and Israel have destroyed the known TEL sites, but none of the hidden ones, and Iran is a major player.
The military technical term for this is time-sensitive targeting (TST) of launcher-erector-carriers (TELs).
It is the most physically demanding task in modern warfare.
During the 1991 Gulf War, the United States enjoyed total air superiority and spent weeks trying to destroy Saddam Hussein's mobile Scud missile launchers.
The coalition conducted approximately 2,500 sorties specifically aimed at tracking Iraqi mobile Scud launchers in western Iraq.
Flat desert terrain, total air supremacy, world-leading ISR capabilities.
The post-war consensus, confirmed by numerous classified and unclassified analyses, is that the coalition likely never destroyed a single operational mobile launcher.
Every claimed “victim” turned out to be a decoy, a truck, or an empty launcher.
Scud missiles continued to be fired until the ceasefire.
Iran has had 35 years to learn this lesson.
Their mobile launch force is dispersed across a country three times the size of Iraq, with far more complex terrain: the Zagros Mountains, urban areas with over 80 million inhabitants, and tunnel networks whose entrances can be identified by satellite imagery, but whose interiors are undetectable.
Iranian road-based mobile launchers can be concealed in ordinary garages, warehouses, under highway overpasses, and inside mountain tunnels.
They can move, climb, shoot and relocate in less than 15 minutes.
La campagne “Scud-hunting” de 1991 a bien impliqué ~2 500 sorties aériennes sans succès notable contre les TEL mobiles irakiens, malgré supériorité aérienne totale et terrain ouvert. Les analyses post-guerre (GAO, CIA) confirment : taux de destruction quasi nul, leurres omniprésents, tirs Scud persistants jusqu’au cessez-le-feu.
Avantages stratégiques iraniens
• Terrain : Zagros (montagnes escarpées), 85M hab. en zones urbaines denses vs désert irakien plat.
• Préparation : 35 ans d’apprentissage, dispersion nationale (3x Irak), bunkers indétectables par ISR satellite.
Implications actuelles (mars 2026)
Israël/USA ont neutralisé TEL connus mais pas caches ; Iran conserve capacité asymétrique de seconde frappe. TST exige ISR temps réel (drones, satellites, HUMINT) + F-35/loitering munitions, mais déni d’accès iranien complique drastiquement vs 1991.
La Russie et la Chine soutiennent militairement l’Iran de manière significative, particulièrement pour contrer les frappes israéliennes/américaines sur ses TEL et sites cachés.
Aide russe récente (2025-2026)
• Accord secret missiles : Décembre 2025, contrat de 500M€ pour 500 lanceurs MANPADS Verba + 2 500 missiles 9M336 (livraisons 2027-2029, mais certains déjà effectifs). Négocié via Rosoboronexport ; vols Il-76 confirmés vers Karaj.
• Hélicoptères : 6 Mi-28 livrés en janvier 2026, dont un déployé à Téhéran.
• Renseignements : Partage de données ISR pour cibler forces US ; traité stratégique bilatéral janvier 2025.
• Contexte : Réponse à la guerre de 12 jours (juin 2025) où USA/Israël ont frappé sites nucléaires iraniens.
Aide chinoise (parallèle)
• Drones & composants : Pékin fournit moteurs, batteries et kits pour Shahed iraniens (exportés Russie/Ukraine). Coopération sur missiles hypersoniques.
• Sanctions contournées : Import-export via “Triangle de la Résistance” (Iran-Russie-Chine) ; exercices navals Golfe Persique 2026.
• Économique : Achat massifs de pétrole iranien (1,5M barils/jour), financement via BRICS pour programme balistique.
Impact sur TEL iraniens
Ces aides renforcent le déni d’accès : Verba portable protège TEL mobiles en zones Zagros/urbaines ; renseignement russe aide “shoot-and-scoot”. Consensus : impossible TST total sans invasion terrestre
The Iranian navy is taking a hammering, and will probably end up being eliminated.
It stood little chance of being of any use anyway, as the US fleet wisely keeps it's distance from Iran and it's various anti-ship missiles.
At the same time, the US is hammering the Iranian navy, mostly because they can, and because most of the ships are sitting (moored) ducks, perfect targets for stand-off weapons - A fast and safe way to rake up some impressive numbers to dazzle the audience at home.
Let's see what the next weeks will bring. USA & Israel decided to start this war, but Iran will surely have a say in when to end it.
Bryen almost sounds like all those Ukrainians who always cheer whenever the Ukrainians manage to damage or sink a Russian ship, while they are losing the real war.
Stephen thanks for your open comment platform at this dire time, and thanks to the many likes and several free subs from your readers (non-anonymous emails only please). Here is today's update focusing on Item 4 on Iranian offensive capacity and on the Strait of Hormuz: 3/4/26: Per my daily Iran Mini-Beat’s (See Beats, Middle East Peace with Justice in link from About), Item 4 on Remaining Iran/Hezbollah offensive capacity, TIME provides an update but few specifics for this mini-mini-beat, but per the House of Commons Library: “Iran retains a broad offensive capability — with ability to strike across borders via missiles and drones — despite ongoing attrition from coalition strikes.” According to a Wikipedia update, “On 2 March 2026, during the ongoing war with Iran between Israel and the United States, Hezbollah, an Iranian-allied proxy in Lebanon, began launching strikes on Israel in response to the killing of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei.[5][6] In response, Israel began launching strikes in Beirut, the Lebanese capital. ” The Israeli Iron Beam is attempting to stop them but they haven’t yet been sent in large salvos, perhaps because Israeli aircraft and drones alert to any sign of launchers and may be able to attack before launche as well as shoot down with Iron Beam and other measures. But this seems very risky for Israelis in the North. Another post by Stephen Breyen’s Weapons and Strategies reports on the dozens of Iranian naval vessels sunk or destroyed by US/Israeli air strikes. It does mention, however, the large perhaps undetermined numbers of small speedy craft run by the IRGC, which now it is possible they have learned how to hide or even keep hidden ashore and launched as needed, full of drones, mines, torpedos, etc. Once again, beware the claims of obliteration. Apparently, Iran does not have, that anyone knows of, a vast artillery capacity there, where Trump is saying he may have US ships “escort” oil tankers. But they have an undetermined number of Khalij Fars anti‑ship ballistic missiles (~300 km range), Hormuz‑1 missiles and Hormuz‑2 missile (~300 km), and Noor anti‑ship cruise missiles (~120 km), according to The Atlantic Council (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/).
Also, see this better summary of the Fatah and Fatah 2 hypersonic weapons and other missile capacity. MD: It could be that given this frightening capacity, one of the stated goals of this war was to destroy Iran’s capacity to manufacture and deliver these weapons in any future conflict. https://raafdocumentary.com/irans-missile-arsenal/. Some contend that large warships are now near obsolete because of weapons such as this.
exact si l'iran reçoit les nouveaux missiles chinois , discussion sept2025 .../.accords janvier./ livraison en cours fev 2026 il faudra 8 minutes pour décimer la flotte US je parle des missiles destructeurs de navires
il faut une formation installation fourni avec 50 techniciens chinois
La Chine fournit à l’Iran des missiles anti-navires CM-302 (export du YJ-12 chinois), quasi-finalisés en février 2026 malgré sanctions ONU.
Caractéristiques techniques
• Type : Croisière supersonique anti-navires/tellures, ogive 500 kg.
Le New York Times et d'autres médias ont notamment confirmé la destruction totale des radars AN/TPY-2 américains, irremplaçables et destinés au système THAAD et à d'autres systèmes de pointe. Ce radar coûte plus d'un milliard de dollars et sa production se limite à une douzaine d'exemplaires. Seuls un ou deux appareils peuvent être construits par an, au maximum. L'Iran vient potentiellement de détruire 50 % ou plus du stock mondial américain de ce système rare et irremplaçable.
Certains analystes donnent le décompte suivant :
L'Iran est parvenu à toucher plusieurs radars américains haut de gamme d'une valeur de plus de 3 milliards de dollars, qui constituent un élément essentiel du système de défense antimissile balistique américain au Moyen-Orient :
Base aérienne de Muwaffaq Salti : AN/TPY-2
Umm Dahal : AN-FPS-132
Base aérienne Prince Sultan : AN/TPY-2
Bases aériennes d'Al Ruwais et d'Al Sader : 2x AN/TPY-2
Même les comptes OSINT fortement propagandistes et pro-américains sont contraints de reconnaître leurs pertes :
Le caractère choquant de cette situation est indéniable : l’Iran aveugle littéralement les États-Unis dans la région. De plus, il lance sur Israël ses missiles balistiques hypersoniques Khorramshahr-4 – également connus sous le nom de Kheybar – les plus perfectionnés et désormais invulnérables. Ces missiles seraient capables de libérer jusqu’à 80 sous-munitions selon une trajectoire très précise.
This needed to be done both because of the number of American troops Iran is responsible for being killed and maimed and to weaken China. However, it should have waited until the end of Ramadan. Ramadan is a bigger deal for Muslims than Christmas is for Christians. Especially killing Khamenei was a mistake. Killing him when they did only makes him a martyr.
So far, the US and Israel have destroyed the known TEL sites, but none of the hidden ones, and Iran is a major player.
The military technical term for this is time-sensitive targeting (TST) of launcher-erector-carriers (TELs).
It is the most physically demanding task in modern warfare.
During the 1991 Gulf War, the United States enjoyed total air superiority and spent weeks trying to destroy Saddam Hussein's mobile Scud missile launchers.
The coalition conducted approximately 2,500 sorties specifically aimed at tracking Iraqi mobile Scud launchers in western Iraq.
Flat desert terrain, total air supremacy, world-leading ISR capabilities.
The post-war consensus, confirmed by numerous classified and unclassified analyses, is that the coalition likely never destroyed a single operational mobile launcher.
Every claimed “victim” turned out to be a decoy, a truck, or an empty launcher.
Scud missiles continued to be fired until the ceasefire.
Iran has had 35 years to learn this lesson.
Their mobile launch force is dispersed across a country three times the size of Iraq, with far more complex terrain: the Zagros Mountains, urban areas with over 80 million inhabitants, and tunnel networks whose entrances can be identified by satellite imagery, but whose interiors are undetectable.
Iranian road-based mobile launchers can be concealed in ordinary garages, warehouses, under highway overpasses, and inside mountain tunnels.
They can move, climb, shoot and relocate in less than 15 minutes.
Yep, war hawks always minimize the opponent's remaining capacity, can you provide documentation for your claim?
Contexte historique vérifié
La campagne “Scud-hunting” de 1991 a bien impliqué ~2 500 sorties aériennes sans succès notable contre les TEL mobiles irakiens, malgré supériorité aérienne totale et terrain ouvert. Les analyses post-guerre (GAO, CIA) confirment : taux de destruction quasi nul, leurres omniprésents, tirs Scud persistants jusqu’au cessez-le-feu.
Avantages stratégiques iraniens
• Terrain : Zagros (montagnes escarpées), 85M hab. en zones urbaines denses vs désert irakien plat.
• Mobilité : Cycle “shoot-and-scoot” <15 min, dissimulation (garages, ponts, tunnels) vs Iraq 1991.
• Préparation : 35 ans d’apprentissage, dispersion nationale (3x Irak), bunkers indétectables par ISR satellite.
Implications actuelles (mars 2026)
Israël/USA ont neutralisé TEL connus mais pas caches ; Iran conserve capacité asymétrique de seconde frappe. TST exige ISR temps réel (drones, satellites, HUMINT) + F-35/loitering munitions, mais déni d’accès iranien complique drastiquement vs 1991.
Iran is probably getting targeting information from Chinese and Russian satellites.
La Russie et la Chine soutiennent militairement l’Iran de manière significative, particulièrement pour contrer les frappes israéliennes/américaines sur ses TEL et sites cachés.
Aide russe récente (2025-2026)
• Accord secret missiles : Décembre 2025, contrat de 500M€ pour 500 lanceurs MANPADS Verba + 2 500 missiles 9M336 (livraisons 2027-2029, mais certains déjà effectifs). Négocié via Rosoboronexport ; vols Il-76 confirmés vers Karaj.
• Hélicoptères : 6 Mi-28 livrés en janvier 2026, dont un déployé à Téhéran.
• Renseignements : Partage de données ISR pour cibler forces US ; traité stratégique bilatéral janvier 2025.
• Contexte : Réponse à la guerre de 12 jours (juin 2025) où USA/Israël ont frappé sites nucléaires iraniens.
Aide chinoise (parallèle)
• Drones & composants : Pékin fournit moteurs, batteries et kits pour Shahed iraniens (exportés Russie/Ukraine). Coopération sur missiles hypersoniques.
• Sanctions contournées : Import-export via “Triangle de la Résistance” (Iran-Russie-Chine) ; exercices navals Golfe Persique 2026.
• Économique : Achat massifs de pétrole iranien (1,5M barils/jour), financement via BRICS pour programme balistique.
Impact sur TEL iraniens
Ces aides renforcent le déni d’accès : Verba portable protège TEL mobiles en zones Zagros/urbaines ; renseignement russe aide “shoot-and-scoot”. Consensus : impossible TST total sans invasion terrestre
And they might have had some help from those Yemeni peasants who forced Trump into a deal last year.
The Iranian navy is taking a hammering, and will probably end up being eliminated.
It stood little chance of being of any use anyway, as the US fleet wisely keeps it's distance from Iran and it's various anti-ship missiles.
At the same time, the US is hammering the Iranian navy, mostly because they can, and because most of the ships are sitting (moored) ducks, perfect targets for stand-off weapons - A fast and safe way to rake up some impressive numbers to dazzle the audience at home.
Let's see what the next weeks will bring. USA & Israel decided to start this war, but Iran will surely have a say in when to end it.
I doubt the Iranians planned to use their surface fleet to confront the navy. They will almost certainly use marine drones, like the Ukrainians.
Bryen almost sounds like all those Ukrainians who always cheer whenever the Ukrainians manage to damage or sink a Russian ship, while they are losing the real war.
Confirmation or refutation of an Arleigh-Burke class destroyer being hit based on thermal imagery?
OSINT suggests that's a false claim.
Stephen thanks for your open comment platform at this dire time, and thanks to the many likes and several free subs from your readers (non-anonymous emails only please). Here is today's update focusing on Item 4 on Iranian offensive capacity and on the Strait of Hormuz: 3/4/26: Per my daily Iran Mini-Beat’s (See Beats, Middle East Peace with Justice in link from About), Item 4 on Remaining Iran/Hezbollah offensive capacity, TIME provides an update but few specifics for this mini-mini-beat, but per the House of Commons Library: “Iran retains a broad offensive capability — with ability to strike across borders via missiles and drones — despite ongoing attrition from coalition strikes.” According to a Wikipedia update, “On 2 March 2026, during the ongoing war with Iran between Israel and the United States, Hezbollah, an Iranian-allied proxy in Lebanon, began launching strikes on Israel in response to the killing of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei.[5][6] In response, Israel began launching strikes in Beirut, the Lebanese capital. ” The Israeli Iron Beam is attempting to stop them but they haven’t yet been sent in large salvos, perhaps because Israeli aircraft and drones alert to any sign of launchers and may be able to attack before launche as well as shoot down with Iron Beam and other measures. But this seems very risky for Israelis in the North. Another post by Stephen Breyen’s Weapons and Strategies reports on the dozens of Iranian naval vessels sunk or destroyed by US/Israeli air strikes. It does mention, however, the large perhaps undetermined numbers of small speedy craft run by the IRGC, which now it is possible they have learned how to hide or even keep hidden ashore and launched as needed, full of drones, mines, torpedos, etc. Once again, beware the claims of obliteration. Apparently, Iran does not have, that anyone knows of, a vast artillery capacity there, where Trump is saying he may have US ships “escort” oil tankers. But they have an undetermined number of Khalij Fars anti‑ship ballistic missiles (~300 km range), Hormuz‑1 missiles and Hormuz‑2 missile (~300 km), and Noor anti‑ship cruise missiles (~120 km), according to The Atlantic Council (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/).
l'iran n'a plus besoin de sa flotte , la reception des hypermissiles destructeur de navires coulera la flotte des américains
Iran no longer needs its fleet; the arrival of the ship-destroying hypersonic missiles will sink the American fleet.
If the war lasts another week or two, the US and Israel will run out of ammunition.
i'm not competent to assess their alleged such capactity. See this report, if anyone can interpret it: https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/table-irans-missile-arsenal
Also, see this better summary of the Fatah and Fatah 2 hypersonic weapons and other missile capacity. MD: It could be that given this frightening capacity, one of the stated goals of this war was to destroy Iran’s capacity to manufacture and deliver these weapons in any future conflict. https://raafdocumentary.com/irans-missile-arsenal/. Some contend that large warships are now near obsolete because of weapons such as this.
exact si l'iran reçoit les nouveaux missiles chinois , discussion sept2025 .../.accords janvier./ livraison en cours fev 2026 il faudra 8 minutes pour décimer la flotte US je parle des missiles destructeurs de navires
il faut une formation installation fourni avec 50 techniciens chinois
La Chine fournit à l’Iran des missiles anti-navires CM-302 (export du YJ-12 chinois), quasi-finalisés en février 2026 malgré sanctions ONU.
Caractéristiques techniques
• Type : Croisière supersonique anti-navires/tellures, ogive 500 kg.
• Portée : 290-460 km (selon plateforme : sol, naval, aérien).
• Vitesse : Mach 3+ terminale ; vol rasant (basse altitude) pour esquiver radars Aegis/Phalanx.
• Plateformes : Camions mobiles, navires IRIN/CGRI, H-6K (si adapté), vedettes swarming.
• Leurres : Éjection leurres IR/électronique en phase terminale ; rechercheur actif radar + IR.
Déployé sur côtes iraniennes
• Menace : Porte-avions US (Gerald Ford class), destroyers Arleigh Burke dans Golfe Persique/Oman.
• Cycle : “Shoot-and-scoot” <10 min depuis Zagros ou Bandar Abbas ; indétectable ISR satellite.
• Impact : Changement stratégique post-guerre 12 jours (juin 2025) ; complément Fateh sous-marins/mines.
Livraisons accélérées via “triangle Pékin-Téhéran-Moscou” ; viol embargos mais contournement via pétroliers “fantômes”.
Le New York Times et d'autres médias ont notamment confirmé la destruction totale des radars AN/TPY-2 américains, irremplaçables et destinés au système THAAD et à d'autres systèmes de pointe. Ce radar coûte plus d'un milliard de dollars et sa production se limite à une douzaine d'exemplaires. Seuls un ou deux appareils peuvent être construits par an, au maximum. L'Iran vient potentiellement de détruire 50 % ou plus du stock mondial américain de ce système rare et irremplaçable.
Certains analystes donnent le décompte suivant :
L'Iran est parvenu à toucher plusieurs radars américains haut de gamme d'une valeur de plus de 3 milliards de dollars, qui constituent un élément essentiel du système de défense antimissile balistique américain au Moyen-Orient :
Base aérienne de Muwaffaq Salti : AN/TPY-2
Umm Dahal : AN-FPS-132
Base aérienne Prince Sultan : AN/TPY-2
Bases aériennes d'Al Ruwais et d'Al Sader : 2x AN/TPY-2
Même les comptes OSINT fortement propagandistes et pro-américains sont contraints de reconnaître leurs pertes :
Le caractère choquant de cette situation est indéniable : l’Iran aveugle littéralement les États-Unis dans la région. De plus, il lance sur Israël ses missiles balistiques hypersoniques Khorramshahr-4 – également connus sous le nom de Kheybar – les plus perfectionnés et désormais invulnérables. Ces missiles seraient capables de libérer jusqu’à 80 sous-munitions selon une trajectoire très précise.
Much of Iran's Navy Neutralized. So what?
This needed to be done both because of the number of American troops Iran is responsible for being killed and maimed and to weaken China. However, it should have waited until the end of Ramadan. Ramadan is a bigger deal for Muslims than Christmas is for Christians. Especially killing Khamenei was a mistake. Killing him when they did only makes him a martyr.
The moot point is does this pass the Caroline Test ? I think not.
Stephen is an Israeli patsy. Always has been.
One might be forgiven for thinking that Stephen is enjoying indicted war criminal Netanyahu's latest war.