I wonder if it is worth mentioning that secretary of defense Lloyd Austin was on the board of directors of Raytheon before assuming his cabinet position. At least some of the massive number of events in question took place while he was a director. The seemingly light weight investigation and response took place while he was secretary of defense. I guess there is no connection. No need to look at it in any more detail than has already been released. For starters, who could look at it that isn't already connected to the defense industry, the bureaucracy, the administration or any of the now highly politicized security agencies?
ITAR regulations are a nightmare. For all you know they accidentally sent the drawing of a #10-32 screw that happen to be classified as ITAR in the 1980's. The only foolproof way to avoid these problems is to treat everything as ITAR, but it makes everything more expensive.
You can have an item that is used in 100 different commercial products in your company, but if it's original use, 40 years ago, was for an item controlled by ITAR, it stays ITAR forever in your system.
A company I worked for had the same problems and fines 10 years ago. I helped set up the systems in that company for ITAR control, and as long as you have people, you're going to have problems.
Being a veteran of the DoD, I wonder what would Mr. Bryen think about moving electronic security and some key weapon manufacturing into direct government control (more than the nuclear arsenal.) I am not suggesting a total nationalization of MIC, only for a few most critical components.
The Defense Department is far from an efficient or, for that matter, a secure operator of the installations it already owns (e.g.., arsenals). In fact, it mostly outsources work from facilities it owns, usually in the form of GOCOs (Government Owned, Commercially Operated) companies. The real issue is the lack of security oversight and DODs low priority on protecting its intellectual property and classified information. Also many of the security personnel are in dead-end jobs and are rarely promoted.
I wonder if it is worth mentioning that secretary of defense Lloyd Austin was on the board of directors of Raytheon before assuming his cabinet position. At least some of the massive number of events in question took place while he was a director. The seemingly light weight investigation and response took place while he was secretary of defense. I guess there is no connection. No need to look at it in any more detail than has already been released. For starters, who could look at it that isn't already connected to the defense industry, the bureaucracy, the administration or any of the now highly politicized security agencies?
If the Merchants of Death weren't responsible for so much carnage around the world, this would be funny.
ITAR regulations are a nightmare. For all you know they accidentally sent the drawing of a #10-32 screw that happen to be classified as ITAR in the 1980's. The only foolproof way to avoid these problems is to treat everything as ITAR, but it makes everything more expensive.
You can have an item that is used in 100 different commercial products in your company, but if it's original use, 40 years ago, was for an item controlled by ITAR, it stays ITAR forever in your system.
A company I worked for had the same problems and fines 10 years ago. I helped set up the systems in that company for ITAR control, and as long as you have people, you're going to have problems.
Being a veteran of the DoD, I wonder what would Mr. Bryen think about moving electronic security and some key weapon manufacturing into direct government control (more than the nuclear arsenal.) I am not suggesting a total nationalization of MIC, only for a few most critical components.
The Defense Department is far from an efficient or, for that matter, a secure operator of the installations it already owns (e.g.., arsenals). In fact, it mostly outsources work from facilities it owns, usually in the form of GOCOs (Government Owned, Commercially Operated) companies. The real issue is the lack of security oversight and DODs low priority on protecting its intellectual property and classified information. Also many of the security personnel are in dead-end jobs and are rarely promoted.
But wandering around an empty Congress demands jail time. Threats to national security are curious things.
The RTX logo looks like the United Technologies logo.